On Theorizing PresenceDavid
Jacobson Presence is the
experience of being engaged by the representations of a virtual world (Lombard
and Ditton 1997, Lombard
2000a). Most research on presence has focused on technologies that use
a variety of sensory inputs (e.g., visual, auditory, haptic) to create a
simulacrum of a real environment, a virtual reality (VR) that mimics
perceptions in the physical world (cf. Biocca
1997, Heeter
1995, Kim
and Biocca 1997, Lombard
and Ditton 1997, Lombard
2000b, Witmer
and Singer 1998). Less attention has been paid to presence in the
context of text-based virtual worlds. This paper presents a brief overview
of theories that identify factors that promote or undermine a sense of
presence in text-based virtual worlds. In the context
of text-based virtual worlds such as MUDs, MOOs, IRC, and Chats, presence
is usefully described as a feeling of getting lost or wrapped up in the
representations of the text--of being involved, absorbed, engaged, or
engrossed in or by them (Lombard
2000a). Immersion is another term that is used in the literature on
presence, but it seems better suited to the kind of virtual reality
afforded by head-mounted displays and data-gloves, in which participants
are surrounded by or submerged in software-generated images, than to
text-based virtual worlds (cf. Schubert
et al 1999:270, Slater
and Wilbur 1997:604-606). As Lombard
notes (2000b),
analysts use different terms to describe a sense of presence. Similarly,
participants use different idioms in talking about their experience of it.
They may say that they are “caught up” in an activity, that they are
“there” or “here” when speaking of a virtual place, or that a virtual
world is “real.” However, from the context of their statements and from
their descriptions of the situations in which they experience presence, it
is evident that participants are referring to their engagement in a
virtual world and to what Lombard (2000a)
describes as an “illusion of nonmediation.” Different
theoretical frameworks are relevant in explaining experiences of presence.
Various analysts (e.g., Jacobson
1999, Lea
and Spears 1995, Walther
1992, 1996, 1997) argue that individuals engaged in text-based
computer-mediated communication cope with absent or attenuated cues,
ordinarily present in face-to-face interaction, by engaging in processes
of "optimized self-presentation" and "overattribution" (Walther
1996, 1997). In the former, individuals selectively construct
self-images, imagining how they will appear to others; in the latter, they
idealize others, imagining how they appear. In these processes, people
become invested in such presentations and idealizations. This theoretical
perspective recalls Stone's analysis of phone sex. She writes (1995:93-95):
According to
reception theorists and other analysts of reading (cf. Barbatsis,
Fegan, and Hansen 1999, Gerrig
1993, Gerrig
and Pillow 1998, Iser
1978, Miller
1995, Ochs
and Capps 1996, Ryan
1991, 1994, 1999, Segal
1995), participants become caught up in virtual worlds when they
exercise their imagination to fill narrative and/or descriptive gaps.
Moreover, the greater the opportunity to imaginatively construct a virtual
world, the more a sense of presence will be strengthened. This is the
“less is more” view of the factors that promote the involvement of
readers. That is, presence is enhanced when the "glory of imagined
description" (Brann
1991:468; cf. Reed
1991:30) is not undermined. Although
analysts agree about the importance of imagination in facilitating the
experience of presence in the context of textual representations, there
are different views regarding the processes that affect it. One view
emphasizes the “willing suspension of disbelief.” Coleridge (1847:1-2)
used the phrase in his account of “exciting the sympathy” of readers of
poetry in which “the incidents and agents were to be, in part at least,
supernatural.” For him, the act of the “willing suspension of disbelief”
enabled readers to engage with what they otherwise knew were “shadows of
imagination.” (The concept of the “willing suspension of disbelief” plays
an important role in semiotic and sociological theorizing about the
construction of and engagement in various kinds of realities--see Wiley
2000a and 2000b.) Laurel (1991),
a theorist of human-computer interaction, and Ryan (1994,
1999), a literary theorist, draw on Coleridge in analyzing the sense
of presence generated in interacting with computers and in
computer-mediated communication. Ryan writes (1999:89):
The
suspension of disbelief model suggests how individuals may become
engaged in textual representations, but it does not explain why such
engagement fails or is otherwise limited. Research in cognitive
psychology addresses this issue. Cognitive
psychologists offer a view of the processes underlying both engagement and
disengagement in the context of textual representations. Gilbert and his
colleagues, drawing on Spinozan rather than Cartesian perspectives, argue
that people initially assign a truth value to a mental representation,
subsequently rejecting it only if warranted by rational assessment. As
Gilbert, Krull, and Malone note (1990:601;
cf. Gilbert
1991; Gilbert,
Tafarodi, and Malone 1993):
Gerrig (1993;
cf. Gerrig
and Pillow 1998), in a critique of “toggle” theories, including
Coleridge’s theory of the suspension of disbelief, extends the Spinozan
argument in analyzing people’s engagement with “narrative worlds,”
including the worlds represented in text-based computer-mediated
communication. Like Gilbert and unlike Coleridge, Gerrig argues that
readers are inclined to accept information as valid in the course of
comprehension, disbelieving it only after conscious appraisal warrants
otherwise. His theory assumes that people will believe what they read
--"persuasion by fiction is the default outcome" (Gerrig
1993:227)--until they critically scrutinize such claims and reject
those that are, on inspection, incredible or unwarranted. In this sense,
Gerrig “replaces a ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ with a ‘willing
construction of disbelief’ (1993:230;
cf. Gerrig
and Pillow 1998:1-2-103). Gerrig's model implies that comparing a
fictional world with a factual one will undermine a sense of presence.
Moreover, since people’s knowledge of or beliefs about the factual world
will vary, different people will accept (and reject) different claims
about represented (or virtual) worlds. As predicted by
the research of Gilbert, Gerrig, and others, presence is affected when
participants compare the textual description of what is imagined and the
reality it simulates. When the real (or offline) referent of a virtual
world is unknown, presence is enhanced (or at least not diminished by
reference to knowledge and/or beliefs about “real life”); when the actual
referent is known, presence is inhibited or undermined, especially when
there is a discrepancy between the image (that which is imagined) and the
actual world it is supposed to resemble (see Jacobson
2001). If knowing the
real world represented by an imaginary one decreases a sense of presence,
knowing participants offline, in real life, increases the sense of
presence. This seems to happen when participants view a virtual world not
as an imaginary one, but, rather, as a medium of communication. They are
engaged not by the textual representation of the faux world, but by
interacting with people they know. This pattern is consistent with the
observations of Towell and Towell (1997;
see
Jacobson
2001), who report a stronger sense of presence among MOO
participants who knew one another in real life and/or who knew one
another's real names than among those who did not know one another and/or
who used pseudonyms. The effect of
offline knowledge of others holds when people know one another
before they interact online. The effect of meeting people or seeing
photographs of them after having first encountered them online appears to
produce a different outcome (especially when interaction is confined to
cyberspace), one that reinforces the argument that imagination (and
projection) plays a role in creating a sense of presence. This pattern is
consistent with findings about the role of pictures in fostering online
relationships. Walther and his colleagues (2001)
found that for people who had interacted online for a long time before
seeing photographs of their virtual partners, the pictures were
disappointing and hindered the maintenance of intense and engaging
relationships, and when people saw photographs of their partners before
they began to work together online, the pictures somewhat facilitated the
development of such experiences. In the case of virtual partners who
formed impressions of one another before seeing photographs, idealized
images did not match reality, and the difference was
disappointing. When a virtual
world is viewed as a locus of activity, Csikszentmihalyi's theory of
"flow" explains a sense of presence (1982,
1988; cf. Trevino
and Webster 1992; Webster,
Trevino, and Ryan 1993). Conceptualized as a "flow" experience,
presence entails a "merging of action and awareness," during which a
person loses "self-consciousness" and a sense of time, focusing on "the
present, blocking out the past and the future" (Csikszentmihalyi
1982:38-42; cf. Danet
et al 1998, Fontaine
1992, Novak
et al. 2000). Flow theory addresses the experiences people have when
participating in activities that are intrinsically rewarding and in which
a person's abilities and skills match the challenges she or he encounters.
Intrinsically rewarding activities are those in which satisfaction is
derived from engaging in "the activity itself, the pattern, the action,
the world it provides" (Csikszentmihalyi
1982:14). Although such activities provide participants a sense of
challenge, people have to feel they are capable of meeting challenges;
otherwise, an imbalance between challenges (demands) and abilities and
skills (resources) will produce boredom (if the resources exceed the
demands) or stress (if the demands exceed the resources), both of which
are said to undermine, rather than enhance, a sense of absorption. In
Csikszentmihalyi's view, activities that induce a sense of flow include
play, exploration, problem-solving, and those of companionship and
friendship--activities that commonly take place in MOO type virtual worlds
(see Jacobson
2001). Theorizing about presence is found within different disciplines, although the convergence is largely unnoted, perhaps because practitioners tend to ignore the relevance of work done outside their own fields. Although theoretical frameworks in psychology and of literary studies, especially those focusing on the role of imagination and on flow experiences, each provides a partial understanding of the experience of presence in text-based environments, considering them together may contribute to a fuller and more satisfying explanation. References CitedBarbatsis, Gretchen, Michael Fegan, and Kenneth Hansen |